Abstract. We formally study two privacy-type properties for online auction protocols: bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness. These properties are formalised as observational equivalences in the applied π calculus. We analyse the receipt-free auction protocol by Abe and Suzuki. Bidding-price-secrecy of the protocol is verified using ProVerif, whereas receipt-freeness of the protocol is proved manually.
The applied π calculus
To better understand the rest of the paper, we briefly introduce the applied π calculus. This includes its syntax, its semantics and the definition of observational equivalence (for more details, see [9] ). The applied π calculus is a language for modelling concurrent systems, in particular security protocols. We use the applied π calculus for its two main advantages: it provides an intuitive way to describe a protocol and cryptographic primitives can be defined by users.
Syntax. The calculus assumes an infinite set of names (which are used to represent communication channels or other atomic data), an infinite set of variables and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols, which are used to model cryptographic primitives. Terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to terms. An equational theory E is defined as a set of equations on terms. The equivalence relation induced by E is denoted as = E . Systems are described as processes: plain processes and extended processes. Plain processes are defined as: P, Q, R ::= plain processes 0 null process P | Q parallel composition !P replication νn.P name restriction if M = E N then P else Q conditional in(u, x).P message input out(u, M ).P message output.
Null process 0 does nothing. Parallel composition P | Q represents process P running in parallel with process Q. Replication !P behaves as an infinite number of process P running in parallel. The process νn.P binds name n in process P , which means name n is secret to adversaries. Term M = E N represents equality of M and N according to the equational theory rather than strict syntactic identity. The process in(u, x).P (input) reads a message from channel u, and binds the message to variable x in process P . Process out(u, M ).P (output) sends message M on channel u, and then runs process P . We can also write "let x = M in P " to represent P { M /x} (syntactic substitution). Extended processes add variable restrictions and active substitutions. By restricting names and variables, we can bind a name or a variable to certain processes. An active substitution { M /x} means a variable x can be replaced by term M in every process it comes into contact with. We say an extended process is closed if all its variables are either bounded or defined by an active substitution. The process νx.({ M /x} | P ) corresponds exactly to "let x = M in P ". Active substitutions allow us to map an extended process A to its frame ϕ(A) by replacing every plain process in A with the null process 0, which does nothing. A frame is defined as an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions by parallel composition and restrictions. The frame ϕ(A) can be considered as an approximation of A that accounts for the static knowledge A exposes to its context, but not A's dynamic behaviour. The domain of a frame ϕ, denoted as dom(ϕ), is the set of variables for which the frame ϕ defines a substitution. A context C[ ] is defined as an extended process with a hole. An evaluation context is a context whose hole is not in the scope of a replication, a condition, an input, or an output. A context
Semantics. Two operational semantics are used in this paper: internal reductions, denoted as →, and labelled reductions, denoted as α − →. Internal reductions allow a process to execute without contacting its context, for example, internal sub-processes communicate with each other, or the process evaluates and executes conditional operations (if-then-else). Labelled reductions are used to reason about processes that interact with their contexts. The transition A α − → B means process A performs α action and continues as process B. Action α is either reading a term M from the process's context, or sending a name or a variable of base type to the context. Specifically, when the output is a term M , out(u, M ).P is rewritten into νx.({ M /x} | P ).
Adversary model. To model security protocols, adversaries need to be taken into consideration. Following the Dolev-Yao model [14] , an adversary has full control of the network. An adversary can eavesdrop, replay, block and inject messages. The adversary can be modelled as an arbitrary process running in parallel with the protocol, which can interact with the protocol in order to gain information.
Observational equivalence. Observational equivalence of two processes is satisfied when an adversary cannot distinguish the two processes. Intuitively, two processes are equivalent if they output on the same channels, irrespective of the context they are placed in.
Definition 1 (Observational equivalence [9] In practice, observational equivalence is hard to use, because of the quantification over contexts. Therefore, labelled bisimilarity is introduced. Labelled bisimilarity is easier to reason with manually and automatically. Two notations are used in labelled bisimilarity: static equivalence (≈ s ) and labelled bisimilarity (≈ ℓ ). Static equivalence compares the static states of processes (represented by their frames), while labelled bisimilarity examines their dynamic behaviour.
Definition 2 (Labelled bisimilarity [9] ). Labelled bisimilarity (≈ ℓ ) is defined as the largest symmetric relation R on closed extended processes, such that process A R B implies:
Note that labelled bisimilarity and observational equivalence coincide [9] .
AS02 sealed-bid online auction protocol
Sealed-bid auctions are a type of auction in which bidders submit their bids without knowing what other bidders bid. The bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the price he submitted. Abe and Suzuki propose a sealed-bid auction protocol [4] . This protocol involves n bidders b 1 , . . . , b n and k auctioneers a 1 , . . . , a k . A price list is published before the protocol. During the protocol, each bidder sends one commit for every price in the price list: a 'yes'-commit if he wants to bid that price, a 'no'-commit otherwise. Auctioneers work together to open the commitments of all bidders from the highest price down until the winning bid(s) is/are found.
1
In order to ensure privacy of bidders, the protocol has two physical assumptions: a bidding booth for the bidders, and one-way untappable channels from every bidder to every auctioneer. The bidding booth enables a bidder to privately submit a bid free from control or observation of an adversary. The untappable channels ensure no adversary can see messages sent.
Before starting the protocol, one auctioneer publishes an increasing price list p 1 , . . . , p m , a message M yes for "I bid", a message M no for "I do not bid", a generator g of subgroup of Z * p with order q, where q, p are large primes with p = 2q + 1. The protocol consists of two phases: bidding and opening.
Bidding phase. A bidder in the bidding booth chooses a secret key x, and publishes his public key h = g x with a predetermined signature. Then the bidder chooses a series of random numbers r 1 , . . . , r m as secret seeds, one random number for each price, and decides a price p to bid. Next, he generates a bitcommitment for each price p ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m) as follows:
Next, the bidder publishes the sequence of the bit-commitments with his signature. Then he proves to each auctioneer that he knows the secret key log g h = x and the discrete logs (log g Commit 1 , . . . , log g Commit m ) using interactive zeroknowledge proofs. Finally, he computes t-out-of-k secret shares 2 r i ℓ for each secret seed r ℓ and each auctioneer a i , and then sends the signed secret share r i ℓ over the one-way untappable channel to the auctioneer a i .
Opening phase. Auctioneers together iterate the following steps for each price p ℓ = p m , p m−1 , . . . , p 1 until the winning bid is determined.
Each auctioneer a i publishes the secret share r i ℓ (the ℓ th secret share of a bidder sent to auctioneer a i ) of each bidder. Then, the auctioneers work together to reconstruct for each bidder the bidder's secret seed r ℓ , and check whether
If the above equation is not satisfied for any bidder, the auctioneers continue checking the next lower price p ℓ−1 . Conversely, if there exists at least one bidder for whom the equation is satisfied, price p ℓ is the winning bid and every bidder for whom this holds, is a winning bidder.
Informal reasoning of receipt-freeness. Using M to represent either M yes or M no , the formula for computing Commit ℓ is as follows:
since h = g x . Thus, log Commit ℓ = M +xr ℓ . By using interactive zero-knowledge proofs, a bidder proves he knows his secret key x and discrete logs of Commit ℓ . An interesting property of chameleon bit commitments is that if the bidder bids price p ℓ , log Commit ℓ = M yes + xr ℓ he can calculate a fake r ′ ℓ such that:
Using the fake r ′ ℓ , the bidder can show that bit-commitment Commit ℓ is opened as message M no , which means the bidder did not bid price ℓ. Using the same method, a bidder can open a 'no' bit-commitment as a 'yes' bit-commitment. Thus, the commit leaks no information concerning the bid, thus the bidder cannot prove how he bid, and therefore receipt-freeness is satisfied.
We model 3 the AS02 protocol in the applied π calculus, with the following two simplifications. In the protocol, auctioneers cooperate to determine the winning bid. It takes at least t auctioneers to decide the winner, thus guaranteeing t-outof-k secrecy. As we focus on bidder privacy, we need to consider only one honest auctioneer. Thus, we simplified the model to have only one auctioneer, who is honest. The AS02 protocol uses interactive zero knowledge proofs to guarantee that each bidder knows his secret key and the discrete logs of bit-commitments. However, the details of these proofs are left unspecified, and thus we did not include them in the model. We simply assume that each bidder knows his secret key and discrete logs of bit-commitments.
Signature and equational theory. We fix a list of bidders (b 1 , . . . , b n ) and an ordered list of prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ), which are modelled as functions with arity 0. We define function nextbidder to find the next bidder in the bidder list, and function nextprice to find the next lower price in the price list. Function checksign is used to check whether a message is correctly signed, and function getmsg returns the original message from a signed message. Particularly, chameleon bit commitments are modeled as a function commit with arity 3: a random number, the public key of the bidder and a message M . The relevant properties of chameleon bit commitments are captured in the following equational theory.
Constants M no and M yes represent messages "I do not bid" and "I bid", respectively. The parameter pk(sk b ) is the public key of bidder b, and r is the secret seed the bidder chooses. Function f(r) returns the fake secret seed of a secret seed r. We can model the function f by just giving one parameter -the real secret seed. Because we assume that each bidder knows his secret key and discrete logs of bit-commitments, he can compute the fake secret seed for each real secret seed, as explained in the previous section. The first equivalence means that if a bidder chooses a secret seed r, bids a price, and calculates the bit commitment commit(r, pk(sk b ), M yes ), he can compute a fake secret seed f(r), and by using this fake secret seed, the bit-commitment can be opened as message M no , which means "I do not bid". The second equivalence shows that the converse situation also holds, which enables a bidder to open a 'no'-commitment as if he did bid that price.
Main process. The main process is represented in Fig. 1 . This process first generates private channels: privch bj for each bidder b j to receive secret keys, untapch bj shared between each bidder b j and the auctioneer, synch used by the auctioneer Fig. 1 . The main process.
The key distribution process. Fig. 3 . The bidder process. to collect all necessary information before moving to the opening phase. Note that ch is a public channel, and p b1 , . . . , p bn are price-parameters, to be instantiated with a constant from the published price list p 1 , . . . , p m . Then the main process launches the key distribution sub-process, n (number of bidders) copies of bidder sub-processes and one auctioneer sub-process.
Key distribution process. The key distribution process P K , presented in Fig. 2 , generates a signature key ssk bj for each bidder b j , sends it to that bidder over the private channel privch bj , and publishes the corresponding public signature key. Therefore, each secret key is only known to its owner (the bidder), and everyone including the adversary knows each bidder's public signature key.
Bidder process. First, a bidder receives his secret signature key from his private channel. Next, the bidder generates his secret key sk b , and chooses a series of random numbers r 1 . . . r m as secret seeds. The bidder then computes each bitcommitment cmt p ℓ as described in Sect. 3. Finally, the bidder signs and publishes his bit-commitments cmt p1 , . . . , cmt pm , and sends r 1 . . . r m to the auctioneer over his untappable channel. As we assume there is only one honest auctioneer in the model, we do not need to model secret shares. The applied π calculus process for a bidder P B is shown in Fig. 3 .
Auctioneer process. During the bidding phase, the auctioneer launches n copies of sub-process readinfo to gather information from each bidder b j . This information consists of public signature key spk bj , signed public key sign(pk(sk bj ), ssk bj ), bit-commitments cmt = commit(ss pm bj , pk bj , M yes ). If this is so, then bidder b j has bid price p m . Otherwise, bidder b j did not bid that price. If there is at least one bid for this price, the auctioneer determines the set of winning bids, and stops after publishing the set of winning bidders together with the winning price over the public channel winnerch. If there is no bid for this price, the auctioneer repeats the evaluation steps for each bidder at the next lower price. In a similar way, the sub-process checknextb is used to evaluate the bid of a bidder b at price p, if there are already some winners. Similarly, the sub-process checknextbnp is used to check the next bidder at price p, if there is no winner before that bidder. We use ⊥ and ⊤ to represent the end of the bidder list and price list, respectively.
Analysis
After modelling the protocol in the previous section, we formalise and analyse the two privacy-type properties: bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness.
ProVerif
ProVerif is a tool for verifying security properties in cryptographic protocols. Given a security property as a query, ProVerif can take a protocol modelled as a process in the applied π calculus as input, and returns whether the protocol satisfies the security property.
In ProVerif, standard secrecy of a term M is defined as "an adversary cannot derive M ". To check standard secrecy, we use the query "not attacker : M ". A positive result means that no matter how an adversary interacts with the protocol, M will never be part of the adversary's knowledge. Otherwise, ProVerif gives a counterexample to show how an adversary derives the term M .
In ProVerif, strong secrecy is defined as: for all closed substitutions σ and σ ′ of free variables in a process P , the process satisfies P σ ≈ P σ ′ (where ≈ denotes observational equivalence). To check strong secrecy of a variable x, we can use the query "noninterf x". Intuitively, by instantiating x with different values, we obtain different versions of the given process. A protocol satisfies strong secrecy iff these different versions of the given process are observationally equivalent. The fundamental idea of observational equivalence checking in ProVerif is to focus on pairs of processes sharing the same structure and differing only in terms or destructors. ProVerif's reasoning about strong secrecy is sound but incomplete. If ProVerif reports that a process does not satisfy strong secrecy, there are two possibilities: either the process indeed does not satisfy strong secrecy, or the process satisfies strong secrecy, but ProVerif cannot prove it.
Bidding-price-secrecy
Bidding-price-secrecy guarantees the anonymity of the link between a bidder and the price he bids. In the AS02 protocol, the winning bid is published, and thus bidding-price-secrecy for the winning bidder is not satisfied. In particular, if all bidders bid the same price, then all bidders are winners, and biddingprice-secrecy is not satisfied for any bidder in this case. From here on, when we refer to bidding-price-secrecy, we mean only w.r.t. non-winning bids. There are two notions of secrecy: standard bidding-price-secrecy and strong bidding-pricesecrecy.
Standard bidding-price-secrecy. Standard bidding-price-secrecy is defined as no matter how an adversary interacts with the protocol, he cannot determine which price in the price list a non-winning bidder has bid. In order to show that an adversary cannot determine the bidding price of a non-winning bidder, we can use the standard secrecy query in ProVerif. We model one winning bidder process in which a bidder submits the highest bid, and several other bidder processes. Each of these processes has a variable p b representing the price the bidder bids. The variable p b can be instantiated by any price in the price list, except the highest price. By inquiring "not attacker : p b ", we check whether an adversary can derive the bidding price of a non-winning bidder. ProVerif replies positively, which means that our model of the protocol satisfies the property of standard bidding-price-secrecy.
Strong bidding-price-secrecy. Strong bidding-price-secrecy means an adversary cannot distinguish between the case where a bidder bids price a and the case where he bids price c. We use observational equivalence in the applied π calculus to formalise strong bidding-price-secrecy.
Similar formalisations have been put forth in the domain of voting. In [11] , a property called vote-privacy is formalised as a process in which V A votes for a and V B votes for c is observationally equivalent to a process where V A votes for c and V B votes for a. The idea is that even if all other voters reveal how they voted, an adversary cannot deduce how V A and V B voted, given that their votes counterbalance each other. Auction protocols differ from voting protocols in that in voting protocols, the result is published, whereas normally in auction protocols, a non-winning bidder's bidding price is not published. Therefore, we do not need a counterbalancing process to achieve privacy for non-winning bidders. Instead, we need a higher-bidding process, which will ensure the auctioneer stops opening (and thus revealing) lower bids. With that in mind, strong bid-pricesecrecy is formalised as follows:
Definition 3 (Strong bidding-price-secrecy). An auction protocol P , with a bidder sub-process represented as P B , is strong bidding-price-secret if for all possible bidders b 1 and b 2 we have:
with a < d and c < d.
The context S is used to capture the assumption made on the checked protocol, usually it includes the other honest participants in the protocol. The process P 1 B is a non-winning bidder process executed by bidder b 1 . The process P 2 B is a bidder process in which the bidder b 2 bids price d. The intuition is that an adversary cannot determine whether a non-winning bidder bids price a or c, provided there exists another bidder who bids a higher price.
We define the context S as νr · (P K | P B σ 1 | . . . | P B σ n−2 | P A | ) for the AS02 protocol, wherer are channel names, P K is the key distribution process, P B σ i are the other honest bidder processes (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2), and P A is the auctioneer process. The context is as the auction process with a hole instead of two bidder processes. We assume all the participants in the context are honest. In order to make it possible to check strong bidding-price-secrecy in ProVerif, we need to modify the presented auctioneer process. Note that ProVerif is sensitive to evaluations of if-then-else constructs, reporting false attacks when using these constructions [15] . We simplify the process by halting it after checking price d, i.e. if-then-else constructs beyond the checking of price d are cut off. Since we assume there is a process bidding a high price d in the equivalence in the definition of strong bidding-price-secrecy, the auctioneer process will stop after checking price d (or even sooner), and the remaining part of the process will not be executed. Therefore, we may cut the remaining part of the auctioneer process without affecting the verification result. To be able to check noninterf in ProVerif, we modify the bidder process by replacing if-then-else constructions with choice[ ] constructions (see [15] for more explanation). By querying "noninterf p b among p 1 , . . . , p d−1 ", the variable p b is replaced with p 1 up to p d−1 , resulting into d − 1 different versions of the process. ProVerif gives a positive result, which means that these process versions are all observationally equivalent. In this way, we prove that the protocol satisfies strong bidding-price-secrecy.
Receipt-freeness
Receipt-freeness means a bidder cannot prove to an adversary that he has bid in a certain way. It is useful to protect bidders from being coerced to show how they bid. Intuitively, bidding-price-secrecy protects a bidder's privacy when the bidder does not want to reveal his private information, while receipt-freeness protects a bidder's privacy when the bidder is willing (or coerced) to reveal this.
In voting, receipt-freeness can be formalised as an observational equivalence [11] . A voting protocol satisfies receipt-freeness if the adversary cannot distinguish (observational equivalence) whether a voter genuinely did his bidding or that voter claimed to do so, but voted for another candidate. In order to model observational equivalence, the situation that a voter provides his secret information to the adversary is modelled first:
Definition 4 (Process P ch [11] ). Let P be a plain process and ch a channel name. P ch , the process that shares all of P 's secrets, is defined as:
ch= νn.out(ch, n).P ch when n is a name of base type, -(νn.P ) ch= νn.P ch otherwise, -(in(u, x).P ) ch= in(u, x).out(ch, x).P ch when x is a variable of base type,
Delaune et al. also define process transformation A \out(ch,·) , which can be considered as a version of process A that hides all outputs on public channel ch.
Definition 5 (Process A \out(ch,·) [11] ). Let A be an extended process. We define the process A \out(ch,·) as νch.(A|!in(ch, x)).
When modelling online auction protocols, we also need to model the situation in which a bidder shares his secret information with the adversary. We use the above definition directly in our model. Intuitively, a bidder who shares information with the adversary sends all input of base type and all freshly generated names of base type to the adversary over a public channel chc. It is assumed that public channels are under the adversary's control. Now we define receipt-freeness for online auction protocols. Again, we need a bidder process P 2 B in which bidder b 2 bids a higher price d, so that non-winning bids are not revealed. Intuitively, if a non-winning bid has a strategy to cheat the adversary, and the adversary cannot tell whether the bidder cheats or not, then the protocol is receipt-free.
Definition 6 (Receipt-freeness). An auction protocol P , with a bidder subprocess P B , is receipt-free if there exists a closed plain process P B ′ such that:
Process P B ′ is a bidder process in which bidder b 1 bids price c but communicates with the adversary to claim he bids price a. Process P 1 B { c /p b } is a bidder process in which bidder b 1 bids price c. Process
chc is a bidder process in which bidder b 1 bids price a and shares his secret with the adversary. Process P 2 B is a bidder process in which bidder b 2 bids a higher price d. The first equivalence says that ignoring the outputs bidder b 1 makes on the adversary channel chc, P B ′ looks like a normal process in which b 1 bids price c. The second equivalence says that the adversary cannot tell the difference between the situation in which b 1 obeys the adversary's commands and bids price a, and the situation in which b 1 pretends to cooperate but actually bids price c, provided there is a bidding process P 2 B that bids higher, ensuring that bidding processes P 1 B and P B ′ are not winners. Receipt-freeness is a stronger property than bidding-price-secrecy, as shown in [11] .
out(untapch, (r1, . . . , ra, . . . , rc, . . . , rm)) For the AS02 protocol, the context S is defined the same as in the analysis of the bidding-price-secrecy property. To prove receipt-freeness, we need to find a process P B ′ which satisfies both equivalences in the definition of receipt-freeness.
According to the properties of chameleon bit commitment, the bidder can send a sequence of fake secret seeds to the adversary, and sends the series of real secret seeds to the auctioneer over an untappable channel. The adversary opens the bitcommitments as the bidder bids price a, using the fake secret seeds he received, while the auctioneer opens the same bit-commitments as the bidder bids price c, using the secret seeds the auctioneer received over an untappable channel. The process P B ′ is shown in Fig. 5 . The bidder in this process communicates with the adversary over channel chc, sending the adversary his secret signature key ssk b and his secret key sk b . Later the bidder sends the auctioneer r 1 , . . . , r m over an untappable channel, and sends the adversary the same list except changing r a and r c to f(r a ) and f(r c ), respectively. The untappable channel ensures the adversary cannot learn anything about the differences.
To prove the first equivalence, we can simply consider P B ′\out(chc,·) as process P B ′ without communication on the channel chc. Since the process P B
′\out(chc,·)
is exactly the same as the process P 1 B { c /p b }, the first equivalence of Def. 6 is satisfied. To show the second equivalence of Def. 6, we need to consider all the executions of each side. On both sides, the process P K only distributes keys, and all the bidder processes in the context follow the same process. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the outputs of the process P K and those bidder processes. During the bidding phase the auctioneer process only reads information and synchronises on the private channel synch. There is no output on public channels in the auctioneer process. We denote the sequence of names sk b , r 1 , . . . , r m , bsk b , br 1 , . . . , br m byñ. After the key distribution, we want to see whether the behaviour of the process
For this purpose, we need to consider all possible executions of these two processes. Here, we consider a particular execution and only show the interesting part of the two frames after each step of execution by the two processes. Let P = P 
